MiGs

Gap Fillers: MiG Family Photo, models by R. Denham.

 

The MiG-15 first saw combat over Shanghai in April 1950. As with the Japanese Zero a decade before, Western observers were not paying attention, and the appearance of the MiG-15 over Korea in November 1950 was a shock. The MiG-15 and the North American F-86 Sabre were roughly an equal match, the MiG slightly better in climb at altitude and in maneuverability in the vertical plane, the Sabre faster in a dive, with better horizontal maneuverability. The MiG had better weapons, but the Sabre had the better gun sight. Success depended on the skill of the individual pilots and the specific tactical situation. None of the other U. S. or British aircraft really had a chance.

After Korea, the MiG-15 saw further combat in the Middle East and was widely sold to all the Soviet Union’s allies and to most of the newly emerging nations. Almost 10,000 were produced by the mid-1950s, including production by Poland and Czechoslovakia. In addition to the single-seat fighter, there was also a two-seat fighter-trainer, the MiG- 15UTI, of which about 6,700 were built. The MiG-15UTI was even more widely sold than its single-seat brother and remained in use in the Soviet Union until the end of the 1980s.

From 1951 to 1956, the MiG-15 was supplanted in production with a modernized version, the MiG-17. Neither the MiG-15 nor the MiG-17 was capable of supersonic flight, which was finally achieved by the MiG-19 series (in production from 1954 to 1961). Only 3,700 MiG-19s were produced; it was sold widely, but it had the misfortune to appear between the exceptional and long-lived MiG-17 and the equally successful MiG-21.

Gurevich retired from the bureau in 1964; he died on 12 November 1976. Mikoyan died on 9 December 1970 and was succeeded by Rostislav Apollossovich Belyakov (b. 1919), who had long been MiG’s chief designer. At this time, the MiG-23/MiG-27 family was entering production. Although the Sukhoi Su-17 was the first operational variable-geometry aircraft, the MiG-23 and MiG-27 were more distinctive, recognized first, and produced in greater numbers. From 1969 to 1982, 4,278 examples of the MiG-23, 910 MiG-27s, and 769 MiG-23UMs were produced. The MiG-23M and MiG-23P variants and derivatives were optimized for air combat and interception, respectively, and were distinguished by an ogival nose cone containing advanced radar systems. The MiG-23B variants and the MiG-27 were dedicated fighter-bombers, without air-to-air radar systems but with more flexibility for carrying bombs and rockets, and they had specialized ground targeting laser systems. These aircraft were distinguished by a sloping forward fuselage, which gave the type its Russian nickname,”Utkanos”(Ducknose).

Too late for combat over Vietnam, the MiG-23 family has participated prominently in all the conflicts since then in the Middle East and Africa and has been exported to dozens of nations. By 1982, when Syrian MiG-23s tried to fight over Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, they were flown by pilots less experienced than the Israelis and were pitted against F-16s and F-15s, fighters of an entirely later generation. Also during the 1980s, MiG-23s had the misfortune to duel Pakistani F-16s over the Afghan border, which proved it was not merely Israeli skill at work over the Bekaa. The MiG-23 was retired from Russian service on 1 May 1998 but continues in service with former Soviet republics and other countries around the globe.

Also entering service in 1969 was the MiG-25, a large interceptor capable of reaching Mach 2.8 at altitude. This aircraft was originally designed to counter the U. S. XB-70 and SR-71 and was produced in several reconnaissance variants. The MiG-25 (NATO code name “Foxbat”) achieved notoriety in 1975 when Lieutenant Viktor Belenko flew an example to Japan, which allowed the United States to examine it thoroughly, revealing a curious mix of very advanced and antiquated technology. As a consequence, the Soviets introduced a drastically improved version, the MiG-25PDS, in order to restore their secrets. About 1,190 MiG-25s of interceptor, reconnaissance, and combat trainer variants were produced by 1984. A further evolution of the basic MiG-25 design is the MiG-31. This aircraft is a highly modernized interceptor, with no reconnaissance or trainer variants included among the 500 or more produced between 1977 and 1986. In 1990, the further modified MiG-31M appeared, but the end of the Soviet Union and the decline of the Russian air force has prevented it from entering service.

The MiG-29 was the last MiG to be produced. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union caused difficulties for most Russian arms producers, especially MiG. The political connections that earlier proved so advantageous now turned into a liability, as MiG was associated too closely with the old regime. At the same time, MiG was supplanted by Sukhoi, which experienced a flowering of design creativity and lacked the political baggage. In 1995, MiG was merged with the newly privatized aviation factories of the Moscow Area (Aircraft) Production Organization to become MiG-MAPO. A new design, the MiG-AT, has been offered in competition with the Yak-130 for the Russian air force’s Advanced Trainer requirement.

Developing Tactics for the Il-2

A sight feared by the Wehrmacht a flight of Il-2s race over the battlefield during a low-level attack in the autumn of 1941.

The Il-2 was central to VVS RKKA’s rearmament plans, with 11 attack aircraft regiments scheduled to be equipped with Shturmoviks within five frontline military districts by the end of 1941. Six other regiments deployed further from the front, and in the far eastern regions of the USSR, were to convert to the Il-2 by mid-1942.

In addition, eight short-range bomber regiments were to also have re-equipped with the type by early 1942. As of 22 June 1941, when Germany attacked the USSR, VVS RKKA attack aviation in the five military districts facing the invaders were operating 207 1-15bis and 193 1-153 fighters. These formations had received just 20 Il-2s by the time war broke out, five having been delivered to the Baltic Special Military District, eight to the Western Special Military District, five to the Caucasus Special Military District and two to the Odessa Military District. But not one had been included in the duty rosters of the units in what was soon to become the frontline. This was due to a lack of trained pilots.

4th BBAP (Blizhnebombardirovochniy Aviatsionniy Polk – Short-Range Bomber Air Regiment) of the Kharkov Military District was the only unit to have modern attack aircraft on strength on 22 June, having received 63 Il-2s, but its pilots had not yet fully converted onto the type. According to official sources, 60 pilots and 102 engineers had been trained to operate and maintain the Il-2 by 22 June, but none had returned to their frontline units by that fateful date.

And even if they had reached 4th BBAP prior to the German invasion, pilots had not received any instruction in Il-2 combat tactics since there was no manual to study! Pre-war tactics were totally unsuited to the Il-2, and did not exploit its capabilities to their fullest extent.

The fact was that the People’s Commissar of Defence had only signed the order for Il-2 combat tests on 31 May 1941. NII VVS (NauchnoIspitatelniy Institut Voenno- Vozdushnykh Sil- Air Force Scientific Testing Institute) issued the corresponding order on 20 June. By decree of the People’s Commissar of Defence, dated 17 May 1941, independent flight crews and flights of the Caucasus Special Military District were to complete Il-2 service testing by 15 July 1941.

In actuality, tactics for the Shturmovik had to be worked out in the crucible of war in the first year of the conflict in the east, with regiments bearing heavy losses in both pilots and aircraft during this period.

With all frontline Il-2 units attached to combined services armies, combined air divisions and reserve and attack air groups of the Supreme High Command General Headquarters, Air Force command was totally unable to maneuver its forces efficiently and focus its main efforts on the primary German lines of advance.

In the early months of the war, Il-2s operated in groups of three to five aircraft, with Shturmoviks attacking their targets one at a time from a minimum altitude of20-25 m (65-80 ft) up to 150-200 m (500-650 ft), using all their weapons in a single run over the target. Whatever the height at which they started their attack, pilots would always fire their guns and drop their bombs from low level. In the absence of enemy fighters or strong anti-aircraft defences, pilots would make two to three attack runs.

When operating at low level, Il-2 pilots could capitalise on the element of surprise to evade enemy fighters. Should they be intercepted close to the ground, invariably there was no room for effective combat maneuvering by the attacking fighters.

Low-level attacks were problematic for the Il-2 pilots as well, however, as they found navigating to and from the target area no easy proposition. The short time they spent over the latter also made it difficult for commanders to coordinate their individual attack runs effectively. Combat experience, and follow-up firing-range tests, demonstrated that low-level operations did not allow the Il-2 to capitalise on its capabilities. The fact was that such tactics were the wrong ones, and could only be justified by the small number of Il-2s then in service, and the poor organisation of escorting fighter units. Western Front Air Force headquarters put it this way in a directive dated 8 August 1941;
‘Il-2 attack aircraft suffer especially inept employment. Il-2 pilots are afraid of being shot down, and often unreasonably resort to low-level flight and lose their bearings, with the result that their missions fail.’

From August, therefore, in an effort to improve the effectiveness of attacks on small targets, groups of Il-2s were led by a mission controller in a Sukhoi Su-2, a Petlyakov Pe-2 or a fighter. They would designate the target by dropping bombs or AZh-2 incendiary spheres on it.

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Cold War rhetoric

It is hard to describe the Soviet threat during the 1970s and 1980s without it sounding simply like Cold War rhetoric. Nonetheless, regardless of Moscow’s enormous nuclear weapons arsenal, Soviet manpower was sobering to say the least. By the late 1980s the Soviet Union had over four million men under arms, of which one and a half million were in the ground forces consisting of over fifty tank divisions, 150 motor rifle divisions and seven airborne divisions. Of these forces, some thirty divisions were deployed with the four Soviet groups of forces stationed in Eastern Europe; 200 to 300 tanks supported each division.

Key amongst these was the Soviet Western Group of Forces stationed in the German Democratic Republic and poised to strike the very heart of NATO. Its ground component comprised eleven tank and eight motor rifle divisions equipped with many of the AFVs described in this book. The air component consisted of twenty fighter and ground attack aircraft regiments.

Throughout the 1980s Washington produced an annual declassified report called Soviet Military Power, which was designed to highlight to decision-makers and the public alike the extent of the Soviet threat. In hindsight this was part of a concerted propaganda war designed to ensure Capitol Hill kept increasing US defence spending year on year. At the time though, Soviet Military Power stood as a very graphic testimony to the extent of the Red menace. Ironically, the Soviet Union was to be worn down by the economics of military confrontation with the West. Moscow’s withdrawal from Afghanistan showed that in many respects the Soviet military was a bankrupt paper tiger. Within a couple of years, the Soviet Union imploded and was to re-emerge as the much-reduced Russian Federation.

It was President Mikhail Gorbachev who, by the late 1980s, realised that the Soviet Union could not win the arms race. When he tried to reign in defence spending, there was an attempted coup in 1991. The net result was that Russia, Belarus and Ukraine dissolved the Soviet Union and created the short-lived Commonwealth of Independent States. In the end Ukraine and all the Central Asian Soviet republics went their own way, leaving the Russian Federation. It was at this point the true scale of Soviet defence spending on its ground forces became apparent. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russia Army still had 55,000 tanks, 70,000 APCs, 24,000 IFVs and 9,000 self-propelled guns.

Moscow’s policy of global arms transfers did not gain it any long-term influence during the Cold War. The only major leverage at the disposal of the Soviet Union was to cut off its arms deliveries, but in the case of Somalia this proved ineffective. Somalia went against Moscow’s wishes over the Ogaden, as did Ethiopia over its handling of Eritrea. Furthermore, in the ever-growing international arms market, there were numerous alternative sources – not least Warsaw Pact members prepared to undercut Moscow. Moscow’s allies were always aware of its limited economic clout. Lieutenant General Obasanjo of Nigeria in 1978 astutely noted, ‘We need in Africa massive economic assistance to make up for the lost ground of the colonial era and not military hardware for self-destruction and sterile ideological slogans which have no relevance to our African society.’

Ironically, the Soviet Union’s huge arms exports did not give Moscow any longterm strategic power. Egypt defected to the American camp, Libya and Syria became dangerous liabilities and while Libya moved to rehabilitate itself, Iraq and Syria fell into chaos. In Africa none of the Marxist governments in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia were able to militarily defeat the rebels, leaving their economies in tatters. Soviet support for Vietnam soured relations with China, while support for Cuba and Nicaragua aggravated America and contributed to Washington’s decision to prop up unsavoury rightwing Latin American dictators.

Ultimately it was economic not military assistance that many of Moscow’s clients really needed. This was something it was unable to provide and the gifting of billions of dollars’ worth of weaponry contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and bankrupted its arms industry. The Soviet war in Afghanistan proved to be a very public defeat for Moscow and highlighted how moribund the Soviet system was. Ultimately there can be no denying that the T-55 and T-62 became icons of the many regional conflicts fought during the Cold War – but at what price?

Cold War Weaponry - AFVs

It is difficult today to remember that at the height of the Cold War the possibility of Communist hordes pouring across Central Europe was a very real threat. For four decades Europe stood on the brink of the Third World War, thanks to the heavily-armed standoff between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. Thankfully it was the war that never was. The Cold War became a historical footnote, sandwiched between the Second World War and the conflicts of the early twenty-first century. It is one of those intriguing ‘what ifs?’ of history.

Washington never allowed its NATO allies to forget the extent of the Soviet threat. Annually throughout the 1980s the US Department of Defense published its Soviet Military Power, which catalogued Moscow’s strategic aspirations and its latest military developments. Anyone reading it was left feeling that war was imminent and woe betide NATO if it was not ready.

By the mid-1980s the Cold War was at its height, with a conventional and nuclear standoff across Europe divided by the Iron Curtain. As part of its forward defence Moscow deployed armies in Eastern Europe with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Northern Group in Poland, the Southern Group in Hungary and the Central Group in Czechoslovakia. This not only guarded against NATO but also ensured none of the other Warsaw Pact members could defect. These forces were used to stop a repeat of the anti-Soviet uprising in East Germany of 1953, the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968. The following year the Soviet armed forces were involved in a Sino-Soviet border conflict and in 1979 became embroiled in a ten-year struggle in Afghanistan.

After the Second World War with tensions mounting between the Western allies and the Soviets, Berlin remained divided between the American, British and French sectors that made up West Berlin and the Soviet sector that occupied the east. This resulted in the Soviet blockade of West Berlin from June 1948 to May 1949. In response the Allies organised the Berlin airlift and war in Europe was only narrowly avoided. However, the Cold War went hot around the world, most notably in 1950 with the conflict in Korea.

The Warsaw Pact of 1955 brought together eight communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Moscow argued the pact was a defensive move in light of West Germany being allowed into NATO. The reality was that it bound Eastern Europe’s militaries to the Soviet armed forces. The Soviet Union was divided into military districts, with the key ones being the Baltic, Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. By this stage the Soviet ground forces consisted of over 200 divisions, down from 500 at the end of the Second World War.

Not only did the Soviets have the numbers, they also had a vast array of weaponry. If there was one thing the Soviet Union was particularly good at it was building tanks. Since the mid-1950s Soviet-designed tanks dominated every single conflict right up until the 1991 Gulf War. Two designs in particular proved to be Moscow’s most reliable workhorses – these are the T-54 and T-62 main battle tanks (MBTs). They are direct descendants of the Soviet Union’s war-winning T-34 and Joseph Stalin tanks. They drew on the key characteristics of being easy to mass-produce, extremely robust and easy to use. As a result they were ideal for the less-well educated armies of the developing world. Having been inside a Czech-built T-54 I can testify that they are certainly no-frills tanks. The finish is not good and there are no creature comforts – clearly a legacy from the Spartan conditions inside the T-34. Nonetheless, they did the job that was required of them.

The scale of Soviet armour manufacturing at its height was immense. The tank plant at Nizhniy Tagil was supported by at least three other key tank factories at Kharkov, Omsk and Chelyabinsk, while other armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) were manufactured at seven different sites. In the 1980s the Soviets were producing approximately 9,000 tanks, self-propelled guns and armoured personnel carriers/infantry fighting vehicles (APCs/IFVs) a year. The Soviet Union’s East European Warsaw Pact allies managed another 2,500.

Moscow sent almost 8,000 tanks and self-propelled guns and over 14,000 APCs/IFVs to the developing world during that decade alone. In effect they exported two and a half years’ worth of production. The Soviets’ ability to manufacture such vast numbers of tanks meant that on at least two occasions they were able to save Arab armies from complete disaster at the hands of the Israelis.

By the 1980s Moscow had a staggering 52,600 tanks and 59,000 APCs in its active inventory, with another 10,000 tanks and APCs in storage. After the Warsaw Pact force-reduction talks in Eastern Europe, in 1990 Moscow agreed to withdraw 10,000 tanks and destroy half of these without batting an eyelid. Warsaw Pact members also agreed to cut tank numbers by almost 3,000. At the same time the Soviets began to field newer tanks such as the T-64B, T-72M1 and the T-80, while retiring older-model T-54/55s and T-62s. They also improved their IFV forces by fielding large numbers of the tracked BMP-2 as well as improving the earlier BMP-1. The net result was a huge surplus of wheeled AFVs available to the developing world.

The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) was once part of the bulwark that helped protect Western Europe from the threat posed by the Soviet groups of forces stationed across Eastern Europe and their Warsaw Pact allies. At the height of the Cold War BAOR, serving with NATO’s northern army group, represented the largest concentration of ground forces in the British Army. It consisted of the isolated Berlin Independent Brigade and the 1st British Corps in West Germany. HQ BAOR was based at Rheindahlen while HQ 1 (BR) Corps was at Bielefeld, commanding three divisions.

The fate of the American, British and French garrisons in West Berlin had the Cold War gone hot would have been certain. It is likely that the Warsaw Pact would have first cut them off and then overwhelmed them. But this never came to pass, however; West Germany and East Germany along with the two halves of Berlin were reunited on 3 October 1990. The following year the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to an end.

While the Cold War resulted in an armed standoff either side of the Iron Curtain, Moscow actively supported the spread of Communism, elsewhere most notably in Korea and Vietnam. Tanks with one previous owner, no strings attached (except when that previous owner happened to be the Soviet Union, there were always strings attached). The fact that the tank was ancient, would not meet your operational requirements and leave you heavily indebted to Moscow did little to deter many developing countries desperate for huge quantities of weapons. From the Horn of Africa to Central America, the Soviet T-55 and T-62 MBTs became as ubiquitous as the Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle.

Although the two Superpowers were cautious about coming into direct confrontation, this did not prevent indirect meddling elsewhere in the world. On the periphery, the Cold War became very hot and on a number of occasions almost sparked war in Europe. Time after time Moscow was able to make good its allies’ massive losses. The Soviets conducted a substantial re-supply of Syria in 1982–3 following their military losses in Lebanon. Major re-supply also took place in 1977–9 in support of Ethiopia in its clash with Somalia and during the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973. Prior to that they conducted airlift operations in 1967–8 in support of a republican faction in North Yemen.

At the height of the Cold War the Soviet Union exported billions of dollars’ worth of arms to numerous developing countries. Intelligence analysts watched with a mixture of alarm and awe as cargo ship after cargo ship sailed from Nikolayev in Ukraine stacked to the gunnels to ports such as Assab in Ethiopia, Luanda in Angola, Tartus in Syria and Tripoli in Libya. Much of this equipment came from strategic reserves and was very old or had been superseded by newer models, as in the case of the T-55 and T-62 MBTs, which were all but obsolete by then. Soviet armoured vehicle exports also included the 4x4 wheeled BTR-60 APC and the tracked BMP-1 IFV.

In many cases Soviet weapon shipments were funded through generous loans, barter-deals or simply gifted, and Moscow’s arms industries rarely saw a penny in return. The net result was that during the Cold War Moscow fuelled a series of long-running regional conflicts that lasted for decades. Ultimately the West was to spend the Soviet Union into oblivion, but the legacy of the Cold War was one of global misery.