It is hard to describe the Soviet threat during the 1970s
and 1980s without it sounding simply like Cold War rhetoric. Nonetheless,
regardless of Moscow’s enormous nuclear weapons arsenal, Soviet manpower was
sobering to say the least. By the late 1980s the Soviet Union had over four
million men under arms, of which one and a half million were in the ground
forces consisting of over fifty tank divisions, 150 motor rifle divisions and
seven airborne divisions. Of these forces, some thirty divisions were deployed
with the four Soviet groups of forces stationed in Eastern Europe; 200 to 300
tanks supported each division.
Key amongst these was the Soviet Western Group of Forces
stationed in the German Democratic Republic and poised to strike the very heart
of NATO. Its ground component comprised eleven tank and eight motor rifle
divisions equipped with many of the AFVs described in this book. The air
component consisted of twenty fighter and ground attack aircraft regiments.
Throughout the 1980s Washington produced an annual
declassified report called Soviet Military Power, which was designed to
highlight to decision-makers and the public alike the extent of the Soviet
threat. In hindsight this was part of a concerted propaganda war designed to
ensure Capitol Hill kept increasing US defence spending year on year. At the
time though, Soviet Military Power stood as a very graphic testimony to the
extent of the Red menace. Ironically, the Soviet Union was to be worn down by
the economics of military confrontation with the West. Moscow’s withdrawal from
Afghanistan showed that in many respects the Soviet military was a bankrupt
paper tiger. Within a couple of years, the Soviet Union imploded and was to
re-emerge as the much-reduced Russian Federation.
It was President Mikhail Gorbachev who, by the late 1980s,
realised that the Soviet Union could not win the arms race. When he tried to
reign in defence spending, there was an attempted coup in 1991. The net result
was that Russia, Belarus and Ukraine dissolved the Soviet Union and created the
short-lived Commonwealth of Independent States. In the end Ukraine and all the
Central Asian Soviet republics went their own way, leaving the Russian
Federation. It was at this point the true scale of Soviet defence spending on
its ground forces became apparent. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, the Russia Army still had 55,000 tanks, 70,000 APCs, 24,000 IFVs and
9,000 self-propelled guns.
Moscow’s policy of global arms transfers did not gain it any
long-term influence during the Cold War. The only major leverage at the
disposal of the Soviet Union was to cut off its arms deliveries, but in the
case of Somalia this proved ineffective. Somalia went against Moscow’s wishes
over the Ogaden, as did Ethiopia over its handling of Eritrea. Furthermore, in
the ever-growing international arms market, there were numerous alternative
sources – not least Warsaw Pact members prepared to undercut Moscow. Moscow’s
allies were always aware of its limited economic clout. Lieutenant General
Obasanjo of Nigeria in 1978 astutely noted, ‘We need in Africa massive economic
assistance to make up for the lost ground of the colonial era and not military
hardware for self-destruction and sterile ideological slogans which have no
relevance to our African society.’
Ironically, the Soviet Union’s huge arms exports did not
give Moscow any longterm strategic power. Egypt defected to the American camp,
Libya and Syria became dangerous liabilities and while Libya moved to
rehabilitate itself, Iraq and Syria fell into chaos. In Africa none of the
Marxist governments in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia were able to militarily
defeat the rebels, leaving their economies in tatters. Soviet support for
Vietnam soured relations with China, while support for Cuba and Nicaragua aggravated
America and contributed to Washington’s decision to prop up unsavoury rightwing
Latin American dictators.
Ultimately it was economic not military assistance that many
of Moscow’s clients really needed. This was something it was unable to provide
and the gifting of billions of dollars’ worth of weaponry contributed to the
collapse of the Soviet Union and bankrupted its arms industry. The Soviet war
in Afghanistan proved to be a very public defeat for Moscow and highlighted how
moribund the Soviet system was. Ultimately there can be no denying that the
T-55 and T-62 became icons of the many regional conflicts fought during the
Cold War – but at what price?
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