A sight feared by the Wehrmacht a flight of Il-2s race over the battlefield during a low-level attack in the autumn of 1941.
The Il-2 was central to VVS RKKA’s rearmament plans, with 11 attack aircraft regiments scheduled to be equipped with Shturmoviks
within five frontline military districts by the end of 1941. Six other
regiments deployed further from the front, and in the far eastern
regions of the USSR, were to convert to the Il-2 by mid-1942.
In addition, eight short-range bomber regiments were to also have
re-equipped with the type by early 1942. As of 22 June 1941, when
Germany attacked the USSR, VVS RKKA attack aviation in the five military
districts facing the invaders were operating 207 1-15bis and 193 1-153
fighters. These formations had received just 20 Il-2s by the time war
broke out, five having been delivered to the Baltic Special Military
District, eight to the Western Special Military District, five to the
Caucasus Special Military District and two to the Odessa Military
District. But not one had been included in the duty rosters of the units
in what was soon to become the frontline. This was due to a lack of
trained pilots.
4th BBAP (Blizhnebombardirovochniy Aviatsionniy Polk – Short-Range
Bomber Air Regiment) of the Kharkov Military District was the only unit
to have modern attack aircraft on strength on 22 June, having received
63 Il-2s, but its pilots had not yet fully converted onto the type.
According to official sources, 60 pilots and 102 engineers had been
trained to operate and maintain the Il-2 by 22 June, but none had
returned to their frontline units by that fateful date.
And even if they had reached 4th BBAP prior to the German invasion,
pilots had not received any instruction in Il-2 combat tactics since
there was no manual to study! Pre-war tactics were totally unsuited to
the Il-2, and did not exploit its capabilities to their fullest extent.
The fact was that the People’s Commissar of Defence had only signed
the order for Il-2 combat tests on 31 May 1941. NII VVS
(NauchnoIspitatelniy Institut Voenno- Vozdushnykh Sil- Air Force
Scientific Testing Institute) issued the corresponding order on 20 June.
By decree of the People’s Commissar of Defence, dated 17 May 1941,
independent flight crews and flights of the Caucasus Special Military
District were to complete Il-2 service testing by 15 July 1941.
In actuality, tactics for the Shturmovik had to be worked out in the
crucible of war in the first year of the conflict in the east, with
regiments bearing heavy losses in both pilots and aircraft during this
period.
With all frontline Il-2 units attached to combined services armies,
combined air divisions and reserve and attack air groups of the Supreme
High Command General Headquarters, Air Force command was totally unable
to maneuver its forces efficiently and focus its main efforts on the
primary German lines of advance.
In the early months of the war, Il-2s operated in groups of three to
five aircraft, with Shturmoviks attacking their targets one at a time
from a minimum altitude of20-25 m (65-80 ft) up to 150-200 m (500-650
ft), using all their weapons in a single run over the target. Whatever
the height at which they started their attack, pilots would always fire
their guns and drop their bombs from low level. In the absence of enemy
fighters or strong anti-aircraft defences, pilots would make two to
three attack runs.
When operating at low level, Il-2 pilots could
capitalise on the element of surprise to evade enemy fighters. Should
they be intercepted close to the ground, invariably there was no room
for effective combat maneuvering by the attacking fighters.
Low-level attacks were problematic for the Il-2 pilots as well,
however, as they found navigating to and from the target area no easy
proposition. The short time they spent over the latter also made it
difficult for commanders to coordinate their individual attack runs
effectively. Combat experience, and follow-up firing-range tests,
demonstrated that low-level operations did not allow the Il-2 to
capitalise on its capabilities. The fact was that such tactics were the
wrong ones, and could only be justified by the small number of Il-2s
then in service, and the poor organisation of escorting fighter units.
Western Front Air Force headquarters put it this way in a directive
dated 8 August 1941;
‘Il-2 attack aircraft suffer especially inept employment. Il-2 pilots
are afraid of being shot down, and often unreasonably resort to
low-level flight and lose their bearings, with the result that their
missions fail.’
From August, therefore, in an effort to improve the effectiveness of
attacks on small targets, groups of Il-2s were led by a mission
controller in a Sukhoi Su-2, a Petlyakov Pe-2 or a fighter. They would
designate the target by dropping bombs or AZh-2 incendiary spheres on
it.
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