Showing posts with label Armaments. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Armaments. Show all posts

Thursday, December 31, 2020

The Soviet Period Military Experience.


The Bolshevik Party, led by Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, seized power in November 1917. It immediately began peace negotiations with the Central Powers and took control of the armed forces. Once peace was concluded in March 1918 by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the demobilization of the old Russian imperial army began.

THE RED ARMY
Adhering to Marxist doctrine, which viewed standing armies as tools of state and class oppression, the Bolsheviks did not plan to replace the imperial army and intended instead to rely on a citizens’ militia of class-conscious workers for defense. The emergence of widespread opposition to the Bolshevik seizure of power convinced Lenin of the need for a regular army after all, and he ordered Trotsky to create a Red Army, the birthday of which was recognized as February 23, 1918. As the number of workers willing to serve on a voluntary basis proved to be insufficient for the needs of the time, conscription of workers and peasants was soon introduced. By 1921 the Red Army had swelled to nearly five million men and women; the majority, however, were engaged full-time in food requisitioning and other economic activities designed to keep the army fed and equipped as Russia’s beleaguered economy began to collapse. Because they lacked trained leadership to fight the civil war that erupted in the spring of 1918, the Bolsheviks recruited and impressed former officers of the old army and assigned political commissars to validate their orders and maintain political reliability of the units.

The civil war raged until 1922, when the last elements of anticommunist resistance were wiped out in Siberia. In the meantime Poland attacked Soviet Russia in April 1920 in a bid to establish its borders deep in western Ukraine. The Soviet counteroffensive took the Red Army to the gates of Warsaw before it was repelled and pushed back into Ukraine in August. The Red Army forces combating the Poles virtually disintegrated during their retreat, and the Cossacks of the elite First Cavalry Army, led by Josef Stalin’s cronies Kliment Voroshilov and Semen Budenny, staged a bloody anti-Bolshevik mutiny and pogrom in the process. The subsequent peace treaty gave Poland very favorable boundaries eastward into Ukraine.

The onset of peace saw the demobilization of the regular armed forces to a mere half million men. Some party officials wanted to abolish the army totally and replace it with a citizens’ militia. As a compromise, a mixed system consisting of a small standing army and a large territorial militia was established. Regular soldiers would serve for two years, but territorial soldiers would serve for five, one weekend per month and several weeks in the summer. Until it was absorbed into the regular army beginning in 1936, the territorial army outnumbered the regular army by about three to one. For the rest of the decade the armed forces were underfunded, undersupplied, and ill-equipped with old, outdated weaponry.

During the 1920s most former tsarist officers were dismissed and a new cadre of Soviet officers began to form. Party membership was strongly encouraged among the officers, and throughout the Soviet period at least eighty percent of the officers were party members. At and above the rank of colonel virtually all officers held party membership.

A unique feature of the Soviet armed forces was the imposition on it of the Political Administration of the Red Army (PURKKA, later renamed GlavPUR). This was the Communist Party organization for which the military commissars worked. Initially every commander from battalion level on up to the Army High Command had a commissar as a partner. After the civil war, commanders no longer had to have their orders countersigned by the commissar to be valid, and commissars’ duties were relegated to discipline, morale, and political education. 

During the 1930s political officers were added at the company and platoon levels, and during the purges and at the outset of World War II commanders once again had to have commissars countersign their orders. Commissars shared responsibility for the success of the unit and were praised or punished alongside the commanders, but they answered to the political authorities, not to the military chain of command. Commissars were required to evaluate officers’ political reliability on their annual attestations and during promotion proceedings, thus giving them some leverage over the officers with whom they served.

THE 1930s
The First Five-Year Plan, from 1928 to1932, expanded the USSR’s industrial base, which then began producing modern equipment, including tanks, fighter aircraft and bombers, and new warships. The size of the armed forces rapidly increased to about 1.5 million between 1932 and 1937. The rapid expansion of the armed forces led to insurmountable difficulties in recruiting officers. As a stopgap measure, party members were required to serve as officers for two- or three-year stints, and privates and sergeants were promoted to officer rank. The training of officer candidates in military schools was abbreviated from four years to two or less to get more officers into newly created units. As a result the competence and cohesion of the leadership suffered.

In the 1930s Soviet strategists such as Vladimir K. Triandifilov and Mikhail Tukhachevsky devised innovative tactics for utilizing tanks and aircraft in offensive operations. The Soviets created the first large tank units, and experimented with paratroops and airborne tactics. During the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) Soviet officers and men advised the Republican forces and engaged in armored and air combat testing the USSR’s latest tanks and aircraft against the fascists.

The terror purge of the officer corps instituted by Josef Stalin in 1937–1939 took a heavy toll of the top leadership. Stalin’s motives for the purge will never be known for certain, but most plausibly he was concerned about a possible military coup. Although it is very unlikely that the military planned or hoped to seize power, three of its five marshals were executed, as were fifteen of sixteen army commanders of the first and second rank, sixty of sixty-seven corps commanders, and 136 of 199 division commanders. Forty-two of the top forty-six military commissars also were arrested and executed. When the process of denunciation, arrest, investigation, and rehabilitation had run its course in 1940, about 23,000 military and political officers had either been executed or were in prison camps. It was long believed that perhaps as many as fifty percent of the officer corps was purged, but archival evidence subsequently indicated that when the reinstatements of thousands of arrested officers during World War II are taken into account, fewer than ten percent of the officer corps was permanently purged, which does not diminish the loss of talented men. Simultaneous with the purge was the rapid expansion of the armed forces in response to the growth of militarism in Germany and Japan. By June 1941 the Soviet armed forces had grown to 4.5 million men, but were terribly short of officers because of difficulties in recruiting and the time needed for training. Tens of thousands of civilian party members, sergeants, and enlisted men were forced to serve as officers with little training for their responsibilities. Despite the USSR’s rapid industrialization, the army found itself underequipped because men were being conscripted faster than weapons, equipment, and even boots and uniforms could be made for them.

The end of the decade saw the Soviet Union involved in several armed conflicts. From May to September 1939, Soviet forces under General Georgy Zhukov battled the Japanese Kwantung Army and drove it out of Mongolia. In September 1939 the Soviet army and air force invaded eastern Poland after the German army had nearly finished conquering the western half. In November 1939 the Soviet armed forces attacked Finland but failed to conquer it and in the process suffered nearly 400,000 casualties. Stalin’s government was forced to accept a negotiated peace in March 1940 in which it gained some territory north of Leningrad and naval bases in the Gulf of Finland. Anticipating war with Nazi Germany, the USSR increased the pace of rearmament in the years 1939–1941, and prodigious numbers of modern tanks, artillery, and aircraft were delivered to the armed forces.

WORLD WAR II
In violation of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact signed in 1939, Germany invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941. Much of the forward-based Soviet air force was destroyed on the ground on the first day of the onslaught. All along the front the Axis forces rolled up the Soviet defenses, hoping to destroy the entire Red Army in the western regions before marching on Moscow and Leningrad. By December 1941 the Germans had put Leningrad under siege, came within sight of Moscow, and, in great battles of encirclement, had inflicted about 4.5 million casualties on the Soviet armed forces, yet they had been unable to destroy the army and the country’s will and ability to resist. Nearly 5.3 million Soviet citizens were mobilized for the armed forces in the first eight days of the war. They were used to create new formations or to fill existing units, which were reconstituted and rearmed and sent back into the fray. To rally the USSR, Stalin declared the struggle to be the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, comparable to the war against Napoleon 130 years earlier.

At the outset of the war, Stalin appointed himself supreme commander and dominated Soviet military operations, ignoring the advice of his generals. Stalin’s disastrous decisions culminated in the debacle at Kiev in September 1941, in which 600,000 Soviet troops were lost because he refused to allow them to retreat. As a result, Stalin promoted Marshal Georgy Zhukov to second in command and from then on usually heeded the advice of his military commanders.

The Soviet Army once again lost ground during the summer of 1942, when a new German offensive completed the conquest of Ukraine and reached the Volga River at Stalingrad. In the fall of 1942 the Soviet Army began a counteroffensive, and by the end of February 1943 it had eliminated the German forces in Stalingrad and pushed the front several hundred miles back from the Volga. July 1943 saw the largest tank battle in history at Kursk, ending in a decisive German defeat. From then on the initiative passed to the Soviet side. The major campaign of 1944 was Operation Bagration, which liberated Belarus and carried the Red Army to the gates of Warsaw by July, in the process destroying German Army Group Center, a Soviet goal since January 1942. The final assault on Berlin began in April 1945 and culminated on May 3. The war in Europe ended that month, but a short campaign in China against Japan followed, beginning in August and ending in September 1945 with the Japanese surrender to the Allies.

THE COLD WAR
After the war, the armed forces demobilized to their prewar strength of about four million and were assigned to the occupation of Eastern Europe. Conscription remained in force. During the late 1950s, under Nikita Khrushchev, who stressed nuclear rather than conventional military power, the army’s strength was cut to around three million. Leonid Brezhnev restored the size of the armed force to more than four million. During the Cold War, pride of place in the Soviet military shifted to the newly created Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), which controlled the ground-based nuclear missile forces. In addition to the SRF, the air force had bomber-delivered nuclear weapons and the navy had missile-equipped submarines. The army, with the exception of the airborne forces, became an almost exclusively motorized and mechanized force.

The Soviet army’s last war was fought in Afghanistan from December 1979 to February 1989. Brought in to save the fledgling Afghan communist government, which had provoked a civil war through its use of coercion and class conflict to create a socialist state, the Soviet army expected to defeat the rebels in a short campaign and then withdraw. Instead, the conflict degenerated into a guerilla war against disparate Afghan tribes that had declared a holy war, or jihad, against the Soviet army, which was unable to bring its strength in armor, artillery, or nuclear weapons to bear. The Afghan rebels, or mujahideen, with safe havens in neighboring Iran and Pakistan, received arms and ammunition from the United States, enabling them to prolong the struggle indefinitely. The Soviet high command capped the commitment of troops to the war at 150,000, for the most part treating it as a sideshow while keeping its main focus on a possible war with NATO. The conflict was finally brought to a negotiated end after the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, with nearly 15,000 men killed in vain.

Gorbachev’s policy of rapprochement with the West had a major impact on the Soviet armed forces. Between 1989 and 1991 their numbers were slashed by one million, with more cuts projected for the coming years. The defense budget was cut, the army and air force were withdrawn from Eastern Europe, naval ship building virtually ceased, and the number of nuclear missiles and warheads was reduced—all over the objections of the military high command. Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost, or openness, exposed the horrible conditions of service for soldiers, particularly the extent and severity of hazing, which contributed to a dramatic increase in desertions and avoidance of conscription. The prestige of the military dropped precipitously, leading to serious morale problems in the officer corps. Motivated in part by a desire to restore the power, prestige, and influence of the military in politics and society, the minister of defense, Dmitry Iazov, aided and abetted the coup against Gorbachev in August 1991. The coup failed when the commanders of the armored and airborne divisions ordered into Moscow refused to support it.

Tuesday, March 14, 2017

ZiS-5 (3-K)

ZiS-5 (3-K)

Aside from the ZiS-5 we know and love, there was another project with this designation, which started in early 1941. The gun was based on the 3-K model 1939 76 mm AA gun, and was noticeably longer than the ZiS-5 that ended up on the KV in late 1941.

Monday, September 26, 2016

Nuclear Submarine project.949A Antey



K-148 Orenburg (August 1985), K- 132 Irkutsk (March 1986), K-119 Voronezh(December 1987), K-173 Krasnoyarsk (January 1989), K-410 Smolensk ( December 1989), K-442 Chelyabinsk (January 1990), K-456 Viliuczinsk (December 1991), K-266 Orel (22 May 1992), K- 186 Omsk (8 May 1993), K-141 Kursk (May 1994), K-512 Tomsk (18 July 1995), K-530 Belgorod (May 1998)

Builder: Severodvinsk

Displacement: 14,700 tons (surfaced), 24,000 tons (submerged)

Dimensions: 505930 x 59980 x 30920

Machinery: 2 OK-650b pressurized water reactors, 2 geared steam turbines, 2 shafts. 100,000 shp = 15/30 knots

Endurance: 50 days

Armament: 24 x P-700 antiship missiles, 4 x 533mm torpedo tubes, 4 x 650mm torpedo tubes (all bow), total 28 torpedoes

Complement: 107

Notes: These boats were slightly longer than the earlier Project 949 submarines, to allow more extensive rafting of machinery in order to reduce their acoustic signature. Three additional boats were not completed. The Kursk sank after an accident on 12 August 2000 about 100 miles from Murmansk. By 2006 about six of the class remained in active service, with the remainder laid up in reserve.
Eleven Project 949A Antey submarines were completed at Severodvinsk, of which five were assigned to the Soviet Northern Fleet.

At one stage it had been planned to develop a new fourth-generation follow-on to the Project 949A, but this plan was later scrapped.

The external differences between the two classes were that the 949A class is about 10 metres (33 ft) longer than its predecessor (~154 metres (505 ft) rather than 143 m (469 ft)), providing space for improved electronics and possibly quieter propulsion. Some sources speculate that the acoustic performance of the Oscar II class is superior to early Akula class submarines but inferior to the Akula II as well as subsequent (4. generation) designs. It also has a larger fin, and a seven-bladed propeller instead of a four-bladed one.

Like all post-World War II Soviet designs, they are of double hull construction. Similarly, like other Soviet submarine designs, Project 949 not only has a bridge open to the elements on top of the sail but, for use in inclement weather, there is an enclosed bridge forward and slightly below this station in the fin/sail.

A distinguishing mark is a slight bulge at the top of the fin. A large door on either side of the fin reaches this bulge. These are wider at the top than on the bottom, and are hinged on the bottom. The Federation of American Scientists reports that this submarine carries an emergency crew escape capsule; it is possible that these doors cover it. The VSK escape capsule can accommodate 110 people.

The Oscar Class is commonly referred to as Mongo by crews of US patrol aircraft in reference to their massive size.

In December 2012, construction began on a special purpose research and rescue submarine, designated project 09852, and allegedly based on project 949A (Oscar II class) submarines. The submarine is designed to carry smaller submarines. Some sources speculated that the boat being built/modified is actually the incomplete “Belgorod”. However, another source gave a different account stating that the boat is similar to AS-31 Losharik, a far smaller special purpose submarine.

 LINK

Wednesday, August 12, 2015

Cold War rhetoric





It is hard to describe the Soviet threat during the 1970s and 1980s without it sounding simply like Cold War rhetoric. Nonetheless, regardless of Moscow’s enormous nuclear weapons arsenal, Soviet manpower was sobering to say the least. By the late 1980s the Soviet Union had over four million men under arms, of which one and a half million were in the ground forces consisting of over fifty tank divisions, 150 motor rifle divisions and seven airborne divisions. Of these forces, some thirty divisions were deployed with the four Soviet groups of forces stationed in Eastern Europe; 200 to 300 tanks supported each division.

Key amongst these was the Soviet Western Group of Forces stationed in the German Democratic Republic and poised to strike the very heart of NATO. Its ground component comprised eleven tank and eight motor rifle divisions equipped with many of the AFVs described in this book. The air component consisted of twenty fighter and ground attack aircraft regiments.

Throughout the 1980s Washington produced an annual declassified report called Soviet Military Power, which was designed to highlight to decision-makers and the public alike the extent of the Soviet threat. In hindsight this was part of a concerted propaganda war designed to ensure Capitol Hill kept increasing US defence spending year on year. At the time though, Soviet Military Power stood as a very graphic testimony to the extent of the Red menace. Ironically, the Soviet Union was to be worn down by the economics of military confrontation with the West. Moscow’s withdrawal from Afghanistan showed that in many respects the Soviet military was a bankrupt paper tiger. Within a couple of years, the Soviet Union imploded and was to re-emerge as the much-reduced Russian Federation.

It was President Mikhail Gorbachev who, by the late 1980s, realised that the Soviet Union could not win the arms race. When he tried to reign in defence spending, there was an attempted coup in 1991. The net result was that Russia, Belarus and Ukraine dissolved the Soviet Union and created the short-lived Commonwealth of Independent States. In the end Ukraine and all the Central Asian Soviet republics went their own way, leaving the Russian Federation. It was at this point the true scale of Soviet defence spending on its ground forces became apparent. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russia Army still had 55,000 tanks, 70,000 APCs, 24,000 IFVs and 9,000 self-propelled guns.

Moscow’s policy of global arms transfers did not gain it any long-term influence during the Cold War. The only major leverage at the disposal of the Soviet Union was to cut off its arms deliveries, but in the case of Somalia this proved ineffective. Somalia went against Moscow’s wishes over the Ogaden, as did Ethiopia over its handling of Eritrea. Furthermore, in the ever-growing international arms market, there were numerous alternative sources – not least Warsaw Pact members prepared to undercut Moscow. Moscow’s allies were always aware of its limited economic clout. Lieutenant General Obasanjo of Nigeria in 1978 astutely noted, ‘We need in Africa massive economic assistance to make up for the lost ground of the colonial era and not military hardware for self-destruction and sterile ideological slogans which have no relevance to our African society.’

Ironically, the Soviet Union’s huge arms exports did not give Moscow any longterm strategic power. Egypt defected to the American camp, Libya and Syria became dangerous liabilities and while Libya moved to rehabilitate itself, Iraq and Syria fell into chaos. In Africa none of the Marxist governments in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia were able to militarily defeat the rebels, leaving their economies in tatters. Soviet support for Vietnam soured relations with China, while support for Cuba and Nicaragua aggravated America and contributed to Washington’s decision to prop up unsavoury rightwing Latin American dictators.

Ultimately it was economic not military assistance that many of Moscow’s clients really needed. This was something it was unable to provide and the gifting of billions of dollars’ worth of weaponry contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and bankrupted its arms industry. The Soviet war in Afghanistan proved to be a very public defeat for Moscow and highlighted how moribund the Soviet system was. Ultimately there can be no denying that the T-55 and T-62 became icons of the many regional conflicts fought during the Cold War – but at what price?

Sunday, July 26, 2015

Zil-157 truck

Zil-157 Soviet command truck

 


The Soviet Union was a pretty forward thinking place in regard to tanks and SP guns, but woefully backward in the area of trucks and transportation in general. When they received the first series of US trucks under Lend Lease in 1942, they were amazed at both the sophistication of American trucks and their reliability and ruggedness. Their own standard medium truck, the ZIS-5, was a 4 x 2 design with brakes only on the rear wheels and noted for only limited off-road capability. The GMC CCKW and Studebaker US6 with their 6 x 6 configurations and reliable drivelines and brakes were a shock.

After the war, the Soviet truck industry built its own version of the two American trucks as the ZIS-151. This truck remained in production from 1948 to 1957 (changing names from ZIS - "Stalin" Factory - to ZIL - "Likhachev" Factory - after 1953) when the ZIL-157 took its place. This truck was an improved version, with its main distinction being the large, single tires in place of the smaller, narrower ones that were paired on the rear drive axles of the ZIL-151. These also had adjustable tire pressure to both overcome flats as well as increase flotation in soft terrain. Later, an automatic control was provided that did this automatically. The ZIL-157 was in production from 1958 to 1961; the improved K model from 1961 to 1964, various other improved models later taking its place. The last variant, the ZIL-157KD, was in production from 1976 to 1982. Most of these were export models (the USSR having changed over to the ZIL-131 in the meantime.)

The ZIL-157 was basically a 3 metric ton cargo truck meaning it had a cross-country cargo rating of 3,000 kilograms or about 6,615 lbs. On paved roads this could surge to as much as 7,500 kilograms plus a trailer, but for the most part the vehicle was not strained that heavily. It had a crew of two and could carry a normal load of 12-16 soldiers in the rear cargo body thanks to folding seats. The vehicle was provided with a self-recovery winch.

Numerous variants were built, the most common being the so-called "BBV" (Box Body Vehicle) versions and the ZIL-157V model tractor for use with a semi trailer. 

SPECIFICATIONS:
Cab seating: 1 + 1
Configuration: 6 x 6
Weight:
(empty, with winch) 5,800 kg
(loaded, with winch) 8,450 kg
Max load:
(road) 4,500 kg
(cross-country) 2,500 kg
Towed load:
(dirt road) 3,600 kg
(cross-country) 2,500 kg
(roads) 3,600 kg
Load area: 3.57 x 2.09 m
Length: (with winch) 6.922 m
Width: 2.315 m
Height:
(cab) 2.36 m
(tarpaulin) 2.915 m
(load area) 1.388 m
Wheelbase: 3.655 m + 1.12 m
Angle of approach/departure: 33º/43º
Max speed: (road) 65 km/h
Range: 460 km
Fuel capacity: 150 litres
Engine: ZIL-157K 5.55 litre 6-cylinder water-cooled petrol developing
109 hp at 2,800 rpm
Turning radius: 11.2 m
Suspension:
(front) longitudinal semi-elliptical springs with hydraulic
double-acting shock-absorbers
(rear) bogie with semi-elliptical springs
Tyres: 12.00 x 18
Brakes:
(main) air
(parking) mechanical
Electrical system: 12 V
Batteries: 2 x ST-84

DESCRIPTION:
The ZIL-157 (6 x 6) truck replaced the ZIL-151 (6 x 6) truck in production from 1958, and in 1961 the improved ZIL-157K entered production, to be replaced in 1966 by the more powerful ZIL-131 (6 x 6) 3,500 kg truck. In appearance the ZIL-157 is very similar to the ZIL-151 but has a slightly different cab (also fitted to late production ZIL-151s), and single instead of dual rear wheels.
The layout of the vehicle is conventional, with the engine at the front, two-door fully enclosed cab in the centre, and the cargo area at the rear, which consists of a wooden platform with sides, bench seats down each side which can be folded up when the vehicle I carrying cargo, and a drop tailgate. If required, the vehicle can be fitted with bows and a tarpaulin cover. Standard equipment includes a cab heater, an engine preheater and many vehicles also have a winch.

VARIANTS
ZIL-157V and ZIL-157KV: tractor trucks for towing semi-trailers (for example carrying SA-2, FROG-3, FROG-4 or FROG-5 missiles)
ZIL-157KG: with shielded electrical system
ZIL-157KE: temperate climate export model of ZIL-157K
ZIL-157KYu: tropical climate export model of ZIL-157K
ZIL-157GT: tropical climate export model of ZIL-157K with shielded
electrical system
ZIL-157KYe: ZIL-157K chassis for special bodies
ZIL-157KYel: ZIL-157KYe chassis with high-output generator
ZIL-157KYeG: ZIL-157KG chassis with shielded electrical system
ZIL-157YeGT: ZIL-157KYeG chassis, tropical climate export model
ZIL-157KYeGT: ZIL-157KYeG chassis, tropical climate export model (chassis has features of the ZIL-157KYu)
ZIL-157YeT: ZIL-157KYe chassis, tropical climate export model (chassis contains features of ZIL-157KYu)