By 1982, the operational maneuver base element for a raid
operation had become a reinforced battalion. The wide variety of possible
battalion maneuvers included flanking and enveloping attacks as well as air
assaults by air assault forces landing from helicopters. The conduct of these
raids proved that commanders and forces were accumulating experience and
increasing combat mastery. But they did not always result in the desired
outcome. Major S. N. Petrov remembers one such incident. Intelligence sources
indicated that a group of 40 well-armed Mujahideen were in the town of
Sherkhankel .This town was in the area of responsibility of one of the Soviet
regiments.
Raid on Sherkhankel
"The 3rd
Parachute Battalion, as the alert subunit, was ordered to move to Sherkhankel
and destroy the enemy at 0200 hours, 20 March 1982. An artillery battalion and
four Mi-24 helicopters were in direct support.
"The battalion commander decided to move at night with
an approach march. A combat reconnaissance patrol would move some 300 meters in
front of the main body. The march route was down a wide, straight road, along
the left side of which stretched an adobe wall. On the right side of the road
was a cement- lined canal that was five meters wide and 2.5 meters deep.
"Suddenly, through a firing port cut through the adobe
wall, the enemy opened fire with a grenade launcher at the reconnaissance
platoon. Practically simultaneously, a machine gun opened fire on the
reconnaissance patrol. The machine gun was in the houses, some 150 meters away.
The paratroopers, attempting to take up firing positions, fell under the
enemy's fire. The battalion commander called for artillery and air support. The
assigned mission was blown, however, and the battalion commander belatedly
decided to use maneuver to encircle the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen struck a
short, powerful blow and then hid, using the system of karez. The battalion had
eight KIA and six WIA. Two of the dead were officers. The battalion abandoned
further action and returned to base.
"My memory often returns to this tragic moment. I seek
an answer to the tormenting question—was there a way to avoid this tragic
outcome? Of course, with hindsight, you have 20/20 vision. This aside, I have
determined the following miscalculations, which had an adverse effect on the
ability of the alert subunit to carry out its assigned mission. First off, the
battalion commander did not consider that combat in Afghanistan did not always
start where you planned it. It might begin suddenly at any location which is to
the enemy's advantage at any time of the day or night. This incident showed how
an adobe wall running parallel and close to a road always presented a serious
danger for Soviet forces. They provided the enemy secrecy and surprise. This
factor was not studied. Second, the battalion column only had security to the
front and was moving on a single axis. This made maneuver very difficult. If
there is a possibility to move on two roads, with flank security, this may
force the enemy to abandon his ambush. Third, in this incident, there was no
reconnaissance and the soldiers were not in full readiness to use their
weapons."
At this time, the inadequacies of heavy military equipment,
which had limited application in mountainous terrain, became apparent. Tanks,
BMPs, and self- propelled artillery were road bound and lacked the operational
expanse for their employment. Contemporary high-precision jet aircraft were
unable to support ground forces effectively with air strikes. Using helicopter
gunships, the Soviets were able, for the first time, to establish more
effective methods of combating the Mujahideen in the mountains. This use of the
helicopters was severely limited later by the introduction of the man-portable
Stinger air defense missile. This appreciably decreased the results of operations
and combat which frequently did not achieve their projected goals.
No comments:
Post a Comment